Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

1-1-2018

Averroes and the Philosophical Account of
Prophecy
Richard C. Taylor
Marquette University, richard.taylor@marquette.edu

Published version. Studia Graeco-Arabica, Vol 8 (2018): 287-304. Publisher link. © 2018 Pacini
Editore. Used with permission.

Averroes and the Philosophical Account of Prophecy

Richard C. Taylor
Abstract
Prophecy is conspicuous by its complete absence from all three of the commentaries on De Anima by Averroes.
However, prophecy and philosophical metaphysics are discussed by him in his Commentary on the Parva
Naturalia, a work written before his methodological work on philosophy and religion, the Faṣl al-maqāl,
generally held to have been written ca. 1179-1180. The analyses and remarks of Averroes presented in that
Commentary have been characterized by Herbert Davidson as “extremely radical” to the extent that “The term
prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation
would mean a high level of philosophical knowledge”. In the present article I discuss Averroes on method in
matters of religion and philosophy as well as prophecy in philosophically argumentative works and in dialectical
works, with particular consideration of the reasoning of his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia. I conclude that
Averroes found in philosophy and its sciences the most complete and precise truth content and highest levels of
knowledge and understanding and from them constructed his worldview, while he found prophecy and religion
to be like an Aristotelian practical science in that they concern good and right conduct in the achievement of an
end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own sake.

Introduction
Prophecy is an essential part of Islam as practiced throughout the ages and, with the signiicant
exception of the infamous Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyaʾ al-Rāzī (d. 925), is acknowledged
by all the major philosophers of the classical rationalist tradition as central to religion, the wellbeing
of society, and human happiness. In Islam it is understood that God has sent many prophets but it
is Muḥammad himself who is the most important for reciting the Qurʾān so generously sent by God
to human beings who already had the natural ability to know God as Creator and to know right
actions by nature (iṭra). Al-Fārābī himself made prophecy and the messenger known in philosophy
as the Agent Intellect an integral part of philosophical psychology and epistemology of human
knowing. The same is true of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) who seems to have felt even more strongly about
the necessity of integrating religious phenomena of Islam with rational philosophical knowledge,1
even to the point of providing a treatise on the proof of prophecy.2
Averroes (Ibn Rušd) was himself a religious judge, rose to become chief judge in religious law
at Seville and Cordoba, and even wrote a handbook of Islamic jurisprudence in which the Prophet
is, of course, repeatedly cited.3 In his treatise on religious reasoning, al-Kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla

D. Gutas, “Avicenna’s Philosophical Project”, in P. Adamson (ed.), Interpreting Avicenna. Critical Essays,
Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2013, pp. 28-47, part. p. 33.
2
Ibn Sīnā, Risālah fī iṯbāt al-nubuwwāt, ed. M.E. Marmura, Dār al-nahār li-l-našr, Bayrūt 1968.
3
Ibn Rušd, Bidāyat al-muǧtahid wa-Nihāyat al-muqtasib, Dār al-Maʿrifa al-Qāhira, 2 vol., 1402/1982.
1
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fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla or The Explanation of the Sorts of Proofs in the Doctrines of Religion,4 prophecy
is mentioned many times and is likewise assumed as a foundation of religious doctrine. This topic
also is touched upon in his Tahāfut al-tahāfut or Incoherence of the Incoherence5 many times. And
prophecy is discussed in his work commonly known as the Decisive Treatise, his Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl
wa-taqrīr mā bayna aš-šarīʿa wa-l-ḥikma min al-ittiṣāl.6 Hence, one might reasonably expect he
would follow his well-known predecessors in the classical rationalist tradition of philosophy in
the lands of Islam and set out an account of prophecy in his three De Anima commentaries as
part of his philosophical psychology. Yet that is not the case. Averroes does not address the issue
of prophecy at all in his Short, Middle and Long Commentaries on De Anima. Perhaps the most
important philosophical commentary in which he critically considers the consequences and issues
of the integration of philosophy and prophecy is his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia,7 a

4
Ibn Rušd, al-Kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla, ed. M. ʿĀbid al-Jābirī, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda alʿArabīya, Bayrūt 1998, 20012. An English translation is available in Faith and Reason in Islam. Averroes’ Exposition of
Religious Arguments, tr. I. Najjar, One World, Oxford 2001.
5
Averroès, Tahāfut at-tahāfut, Texte arabe inédit établi par M. Bouyges, Imprimerie Catholique, Bayrūt 1930, 1987
(Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Série arabe III); English translation in Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of
the Incoherence), tr. by S. Van Den Bergh, 2 vol., Luzac & Co., London 1954 (rpt. 1969, 1978), e.g., pp. 427-8; tr. pp. 257-8.
6
Averroes. The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection Between the Law and Wisdom & Epistle Dedicatory, tr. and ed. Ch.E. Butterworth, Brigham Young U.P., Provo Utah 2001. I have sometimes given a literal rending of the title
as The Book of the Distinction of Discourse and the Establishment of the Connection between the Religious Law and Philosophy
following the critique of European translations by El Ghannouchi, “Distinction et relation des discours philosophique et
religieux chez Ibn Rushd: Faṣl al maqāl ou la double verité”, in R.G. Khoury (ed.), Averroes (1126-1198) oder der Triumph des
Rationalismus, Internationales Symposium anlässlich des 800. Todestages des islamischen Philosophen, Universitätsverlag C.
Winter, Heidelberg 2002, pp. 139-45, part. p. 145. See Taylor, “Ibn Rushd / Averroes and ‘Islamic’ Rationalism”, in Medieval
Encounters. Jewish, Christian and Muslim Culture in Conluence and Dialogue 15 (2009), pp. 125-35. [Special issue on AlAndalus: Cultural Difusion and Hybridity, ed. I. Coris]; Id., “Averroes on the Sharīʿah of the Philosophers”, in R.C. Taylor
– I. Omar (eds.), The Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Heritage: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives in the Abrahamic
Traditions, Marquette U.P., Milwaukee (WI) 2012, pp. 283-304; and Id., “Providence in Averroes”, in P. d’Hoine - G.Van
Riel (eds.), Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought. Collected Studies in
Honour of Carlos Steel, KU Leuven U.P., Leuven 2014 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf - Mansion Centre,
Series I), pp. 454-72. Cf. the introduction pp. 1-3 by Campanini to his translation in Averroes, the Decisive Treatise. The Connection Between Islamic Religious Law and Philosophy, trans. and ed. M. Campanini, Gorgias Press, Piscataway NJ (2017).
“Decisive Treatise” in the sense of a determining or determinative account by Averroes as judge and legal scholar will suice
for present purposes. The rhyme of al-maqāl with ittiṣāl may support the short title as Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl. There may also be
an intentional connection to the use of faṣl in Qurʿān 38:20. My thanks to Josep Puig Montada and Fouad Ben Ahmad for
sharing their insightful relections on this issue. Precisely how the title should be understood requires further relection.
7
Averrois Cordubensis Compendia Librorum Aristotelis qui Parva Naturalia vocantur, Arabic text, ed. H. Blumberg,
The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge (Mass.) 1972. English translation as Averroes. Epitome of Parva Naturalia,
tr. H. Blumberg, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge (Mass.) 1961. In his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction
with the Active Intellect, a work which sets forth an account of philosophical psychology like that found in the Short Commentary on the De Anima, Averroes provides a thoroughgoing analysis of human knowing in response to Aristotle’s remarks
at the end of De Anima 3.7. There Aristotle raised the question of whether separate things can be known by human beings
existing in the body. (Averroes again treats of this issue much later in book 3, comment 36, of this Long Commentary on the
De Anima of Aristotle. See Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F.S. Crawford,
Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge Mass. 1953 [Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Versionum Latinarum
VII, 1], pp. 479-502; and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, Translated with
Introduction and Notes by R.C. Taylor with Th.-A. Druart Subeditor, Yale U.P., New Haven 2009, pp. 381-401). In the inal
sections of the Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction after his philosophical accounts have been set out, Averroes works to
show how philosophical perfection of the soul and the apprehension of God as the First Form accords with religious law and
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work with discussion of issues raised in his study of a curiously novel version of the Parva Naturalia
of Aristotle.8
In the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia Averroes provides a presentation of prophecy
distinctively diferent both from what is found in al-Fārābī and Avicenna and from what is set forth
in his own Faṣl al-maqāl, al-Kašf , and Tahāfut al-tahāfut. The peculiarity of his analysis and teaching
in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia is noted by Herbert Davidson who writes,
Averroes is making an extremely radical statement for a medieval philosopher, a statement from which
he appears to retreat elsewhere. He is asserting that the phenomena we are considering, including
revelation and prophecy, give no reliable information about matters belonging to the domain of science,
not even by furnishing the uneducated with a igurative representation of theoretical truths. Revelation
and prophecy do not, either expressly or allusively, instruct mankind about God, the universe, creation,
the human soul. They promulgate no rules of human behavior leading to eudaemonia. Revelation as
well as the written record of revealed knowledge thus contribute nothing to the soul’s well-being.9

In noting the diference between what Averroes says in the Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and what we ind
in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, Davidson further remarks that
The discrepancy is harsh. The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia advanced carefully reasoned
arguments to show that the phenomenon of revelation cannot conceivably provide knowledge
about subjects belonging to the domain of science and philosophy, that revelation cannot even recast
theoretical knowledge in igurative images for the use of common people. Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut
and semipopular works airm, on the contrary, that the prophet and the phenomenon of revelation do
teach theoretical matters to the unenlightened in a igurative language comprehensible to them, and
that revelation hints to potential philosophers where the purer expression of truth lies.10

Suggesting two ways of dealing with the diference of accounts, one that “Averroes may have
changed his mind” and the other that the contexts of works may have determined the diference,
Davidson writes regarding the latter,
The intent would be instead that the human author of Scripture irst acquired theoretical knowledge
through proper scientiic methods and then coolly and deliberately – not through an inspired
imaginative faculty – recast his hard-won philosophic knowledge into language appropriate for his less

prayer for the sake of the remembrance of God. See The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn
Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni, Ed. and tr. K.P. Bland, The Jewish Theological Seminar of America, New York
1982, pp. 103-5; also see p. 69 and p. 87. The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, the Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction
and the Short Commentary on the De Anima are all doctrinally prior to his Middle Commentary on the De Anima. They are
also temporally prior to his account in the Faṣl al-maqāl of methodology and its theological companion piece, al-Kašf, both of
which are generally held to have been written around 1179-80. Prophecy is briely discussed in a Farabian political fashion in
his Commentary on the Republic of Plato. See Averroes On Plato’s Republic, English tr. by R. Lerner, Cornell U.P., Ithaca (NY)
- London 1974, pp. 48, 72, 80-81.
8
See R. Hansberger, “Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs: Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia in Arabic Guise”, in C. Grellard P.-M. Morel (eds.), Les Parva Naturalia d’ Aristote: Fortune antique et médévale, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 2010,
pp. 143-62.
9
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes On Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect and Theories of Human Intellect, Oxford U.P., New York - Oxford 1992, p. 344.
10
Davidson Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes (above, n. 9), p. 350.
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enlightened brethren. The term prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing more than the human
author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of philosophical knowledge.11

It is evident enough that Averroes may well have had a change of mind as to whether prophecy
should be discussed in the context of philosophical psychology given its absence from his commentaries
on De Anima.12 The question of whether there is a doctrinal or perhaps methodological change
involves a larger consideration of his philosophical thought on the issue of prophecy. That, however,
requires consideration of his methodology in dealing with religious matters in his various kinds of
writings. Hence, in what follows I irst set out Averroes’s account of method in writing on matters
that concern issues involving the intersection of religion and philosophy, a method that requires a
distinction of discourse between writings that are ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) as open to all and writings that
are ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) as reserved solely for the philosophically astute. Second, I consider
prophecy in a selection of key ‘evident’ works. Third, I consider prophecy in selected passages of
some philosophical works where matters of concern to religion are treated following the ‘interpreted’
approach. Fourth, I make application of this method to his own works in reference to the strong
remarks of Davidson quoted above. Finally, I conclude with a consideration of his world view and
what appears to be his idiosyncratic conception of religion.
1. Averroes on Method in Matters of Religion and Philosophy
Averroes’s famous disavowal of the possibility of a double truth, one for religion and one
for philosophy and wisdom (including science), with the clear statement of the unity of truth
in his Faṣl al-maqāl that “truth cannot contradict truth,”13 is the foundational principle that
underlies his distinction of discourse. This requires that where there is disagreement on issues
that are included in the subject matter of both religious and philosophical study and investigation,
priority be given to the philosophical and scientiic interpretation absolutely speaking. Yet the
majority of people are not capable of grasping this distinction of discourse and of reconciling such
an interpretation with religious discourse since this latter by its very nature is meant to be emotive
and dialectically persuasive. Accordingly Averroes sets out a psychological division of human
beings into three groupings. There are those who are moved by the rhetoric of emotional suasion
through accounts that afect the heart and imagination. Others give assent to dialectical reasoning
based on religious postulates yielding understandings in accord with religious tradition. The
third consists of those who are intellectuals knowledgeable and trained in the philosophical arts
employing the reasoning of logic and the method of demonstration. The irst two are persuaded to
assent by ways that may in fact hit on the truth though there is no necessity that they entail truth.
The third, however, by the very method of demonstration with the use of premises known to be
necessary and true and with the employment of valid syllogistic form, can attain truth per se and
with necessity.14 Of course, Averroes clearly states that some fundamentals of religion are such
that they must be held by the people of all three levels, namely God’s existence, His dispatching

Ibid., pp. 351-2. Emphasis by Davidson.
While it is not what Davidson seems to have in mind, I want to suggest that the Commentary on the Parva
Naturalia may have been written before Averroes came to be fully determined to use methodologically the distinction of
ẓāhir and muʾawwal writings separating modes of discourse.
13
See R. Taylor, “‘Truth does not contradict truth’: Averroes and the Unity of Truth”, Topoi 19 (2000), pp. 3-16.
14
See Taylor, “Ibn Rushd / Averroes and ‘Islamic’ Rationalism” (above n. 6), and “Averroes on the Sharīʿah of the
Philosophers” (above, n. 6).
11

12
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of prophets to humanity and an afterlife of reward and punishment.15 To these universal
requirements Averroes adds that in the case of philosophical interpretations that may confuse
the general populace irrespective of their truth, these may not be shared outside the circle of the
third group, the people of demonstration. For those incapable of understanding at this highest
level, these interpretations would pose a serious threat to religious belief, perhaps even leading to
unbelief.16 Such is the case with the issue of the nature and meaning of the afterlife.17 Hence, the
distinction of discourse supports the practical life of members of society who are guided by religious
teachings toward the good and right in their lives as individuals and members of the community
of believers. It also allows for religious teachings to be interpreted by those with qualiied skills
and with insight and sensitivity regarding the good of all, provided they not undermine those less
capable of understanding.
In his Kašf Averroes refers to this distinction of discourse in matters of religion when he writes,
In a separate work [scil. the Faṣl al-maqāl] we have already made clear the congruity of [philosophical]
wisdom with [religious] Law (al-ḥikma li-š-šarʿ) and the command of religion for [the doing of
philosophy]. We said there that [religious] Law (al-šarīʿa) has two parts: [one] evident and [one]
interpreted (ẓāhir wa-muʾawwal). The evident is obligatory for the majority (al-ǧumhūr) and the
interpreted (al-muʾawwal) obligatory for the learned (al-ulamāʾ). The obligation of the majority in
regard to it is to take it according to its evident sense and to refrain from interpreting it (taʾwīla-hu); for
the learned it is not permitted to inform the majority of its interpretation.18

In this work his concern is to investigate ways of reasoning concerning religious beliefs which are
evident (ʿan al-ẓāhiri min al-ʿaqāʾidi) and proper for belief by the people (al-nās), not to delve into
matters of interpretation suited only to the learned well versed in philosophy and the sciences. His
rationale is that the people of the religion of Islam have been confused by many publicly professed
interpretations that stray “from the intent of the lawgiver” (ʿan maqṣid al-šāriʿ).
In this way Averroes sets out a methodology regarding matters of religion which intersect with
philosophical studies. In his own works this distinction is maintained in the surface text with the Faṣl almaqāl, al-Kašf ʿan manāhiǧ, and the Tahāfut al-tahāfut which should be classiied as dialectical (and
perhaps in parts rhetorical) works with their starting points being fundamental principles of religion.
The target audiences for these works are stated to be people of the rhetorical and dialectical modes of
assent.19 In contrast, his philosophical works which he calls demonstrative are concerned with what
can be determined through human rational scientiic investigation and learning. While these two
modes of discourse are to be employed, airmed and maintained for the good of the majority in society,

Averroes Faṣl al-maqāl, p. 18 Butterworth.
Averroes, Faṣl al-maqāl, p. 21 Butterworth.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibn Rušd, al-Kašf, p. 99 al-Jābirī. My translation.
19
See Averroes, Faṣl al-maqāl, pp. 19 and 21; al-Kašf, pp. 99-100 al-Jābirī; Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 427-8 Bouyges,
tr. pp. 257-8. Cf. B.S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation, SUNY Press, Albany (NY) 1985, pp. 255-6.
In the case of another dialectical work, his Question on Divine Knowledge, the so-called Damima, his account is largely
a philosophical explanation of God’s prior eternal knowledge not being dependent on worldly things. He means to
imply – without suicient explanation – that divine knowledge includes knowledge of particulars. See the text in Faṣl
al-maqāl, p. 42 Butterworth. His philosophical account of divine knowledge elsewhere indicates a lack of knowledge of
particulars as such on the part of God. See Averroes, Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, pp. 74-75 Blumberg. Also see
Averroès, Tafsir ma baʿd at-tabiʿat (above, n. 5), pp. 1707-8.
15

16
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the principle of the unity of truth still applies. That is, in matters of religion where religious teachings
and philosophical reasoning intersect, there is one truth, not two, and the primacy of philosophy with
its method of demonstration must be maintained, precisely as argued in the Faṣl al-maqāl.
I have argued elsewhere that this distinction is maintained by Averroes regarding the issues
of personal immortality, divine providence and creation.20 As he points out in the Faṣl al-maqāl,
the issue of the afterlife is a matter of considerable dispute over its full meaning and purpose and
disputation of that sort must not be shared with the majority who would surely be confused and
harmed by such questioning. Instead, they must be permitted only the ‘evident’ understanding and
not be exposed to the ‘interpreted’ understanding.21 Following the guidelines of the Faṣl al-maqāl
reiterated in al-Kašf and the Ṭahāfut al-ṭahāfut, the truth of the matter is to be determined in the
philosophical sciences. There is no doctrine of an afterlife in his Short and Middle Commentaries
on De Anima and even assertions of the absence of an afterlife for individuals are expressed in his
Long Commentary on the De Anima and his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics.22 As for divine
providence, in his Tahāfut al-tahāfut he presents the ‘evident’ account with God as the intentional
agent of providence clearly airming it, while in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics he denies
divine intentionality through direct, eicient, providential causation and instead airms that God’s
providence must be understood as per accidens to God’s own self-understanding.23 Hence, in these
cases the true understanding of each issue is to be had in philosophy with ‘interpreted’ meanings for
these important religious teachings, interpretations that must be kept from the majority.
2. Prophecy in Three Dialectical Religious Works
In the Faṣl al-maqāl prophecy is repeatedly airmed throughout as is the division of the levels
of religious meaning in scripture appropriate for the three groupings of people discussed above.
As also indicated earlier, all three are said by Averroes to have the ability to know (al-maʿrifa) in
an airmative way the existence of God, his sending of prophets to humankind, and reward and
punishment in the afterlife: “[T]he three sorts of indications due to which no one is exempted from
assenting to what he is responsible for being cognizant of – I mean, the rhetorical, dialectical and
demonstrative indications – lead to these three roots”.24 These are the fundamental beliefs that lead
human beings to proper action and all are airmed in the Qurʾān.
In the Tahāfut al-tahāfut the airmation of prophecy is also assumed throughout.25 There
Averroes asserts, as expected, that miracles are principles of religion not to be questioned or doubted
because they are beyond human apprehension. Their value lies in guiding human beings to virtue and
so they play a key role in the foundational assumptions of practical science.26 Even so, the miracles

R.C. Taylor, “Personal Immortality in Averroes’ Mature Philosophical Psychology”, Documenti e studi sulla
tradizione ilosoica medievale 9 (1998), pp. 87-110; Id., “Averroes on the Ontology of the Human Soul”, Muslim World
102 (2012), pp. 580-96; Id., “Conceiving Creation According to Ibn Rushd / Averroes” (video lecture), The Catholic
University of America, 3 December 2013 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t8UpixK0hUs; and Id., “Providence in Averroes” (above, n. 6).
21
Averroes, Faṣl al-Maqāl, pp. 20 f. Butterworth.
22
See Averroes, Tafsir ma baʿd at-tabiʿat, pp. 1612-13 Bouyges. Also see Taylor “Ibn Rushd / Averroes and ‘Islamic’
Rationalism” (above n. 6); and Id., “Averroes on the Ontology of the Human Soul” (above, n. 20).
23
See Taylor, “Providence in Averroes” (above, n. 6).
24
Averroes, Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 18 Butterworth.
25
See, for example, Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 427-8 Bouyges, tr. pp. 257-8.
26
Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 514 f. Bouyges, tr. pp. 314 f.
20
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performed by prophets need not be considered to be the bringing about of what is logically impossible
but perhaps rather what is possible in itself but not possible for human beings. However, the most
certain of all miracles is the Qurʾān itself:
The clearest of miracles is the Venerable Book of Allah, the existence of which is not an interruption of
the course of nature assumed by tradition, like the changing of a rod into a serpent, but its miraculous
nature is established by way of perception and consideration of every man who has been or will be till
the day of resurrection. And so this miracle is far superior to all others.27

Further, the true reality of the nature of the prophet as prophet is to be found “in the act of making
known the mysterious and establishing laws which are in accordance with the truth and which bring
about acts that will determine the happiness of the totality of mankind.”28 The true airmation of
the prophet lies in this and not in the attainment of hidden knowledge through dreams which may
have natural explanations.29 The religious laws that come from God via prophets together with natural
human reason are needed for the sake of the construction of a proper political structure and society. Basic
principles common to all religions received from prophets and lawgivers have their value and certiication
in the guidance of human beings away from wickedness and toward actions that are virtuous.30
In al-Kašf Averroes devotes several pages to the issue of God’s sending of messengers, including a
detailed critical analysis of religious reasoning by dialectical theologians followed by an explanation of
the Qurʾān itself and the success of its message for the betterment of humankind. The airmation of
the prophet rests on two principles: the evident existence of prophets as conveyers of religious laws in
revelation concerning knowledge and right actions for the attainment of happiness, and the evident
function of prophets as setting out religious laws in revelation from God.31 It is not necessarily the case that
every miracle worker is a prophet, but it is the case that the Qurʾān itself with the knowledge it provides
regarding religious laws, right human conduct, and even more about the nature of God is rightly deemed
miraculous for its consequences. In this the proof of God’s prophet is the goodness of the Qurʾān in its
presence in guiding human beings, just as the proof of the physician lies in the actual healing of the sick.32
In each of these works the existence and nature of prophecy is taken as evident in the experience
of human beings in connection with the Qurʾān’s message which provides religious laws for the
guidance of humankind toward goodness. In the religious context of these writings, the soundness of
religious scripture, like the proof of the physician found in the cure of the patient, lies in the positive
outcome for human society.33
3. Prophecy in Four Philosophical Works
The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia
The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia is a rather odd text, as mentioned earlier, because
it is based on a substantially revised and reworked version of Aristotle’s text that circulated

Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 515-16 Bouyges; tr. p. 315.
Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, p. 516 Bouyges; tr. p. 316.
29
Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, p. 533 Bouyges; tr. p. 326.
30
Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 584-5 Bouyges; tr. p. 361.
31
Averroes, Al-Kašf, pp. 179-80.
32
Averroes, Al-Kašf, pp. 184-5.
33
For a valuable discussion of the reasoning of Averroes on prophecy in his al-Kašf, see N. Zouggar, “La prophétologie
d’Averroès dans le Kašf mahāhig al-adilla”, Annales Islamologiques 46 (2012), pp. 387-408.
27

28
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in Arabic.34 The key part for present concerns is Averroes’s discussion of prophecy in the section
corresponding to Aristotle’s On Dreams. For Averroes dreams may be true or false but either way
they relate to the imagination (al-mutaḫayyala) and people believe that prophecy is from God
(yaʿtaqidūna fī l-waḥyi annahu min Allāh). It seems particularly to involve matters of knowledge
relevant to the attainment of happiness according to them (ʿindahum).35 But it comes about in
us in the same way as the primary principles of understanding, that is, the way the agent intellect
bestows those primary principles which can be helpful in the forming of new knowledge.36 What is
most mysterious, however, is that the intelligences themselves – this includes the agent intellect as
well as God properly speaking – cannot comprehend particulars since they have no matter and so
only know universals. Regarding this Averroes expresses amazement over two issues. First, how can
the human imagination get particulars of dreams from a universal immaterial nature which is an
intellect? Second, how does the separate intellect (e.g., the agent intellect or even God) single out the
particular recipient for the particular content with the particular dream if that intellect only knows
universals?37 With no lack of boldness, Averroes then writes, “Now the discussion concerning these
matters, even though it be very diicult for human comprehension, must nevertheless be undertaken
to the limit of one’s natural capacity for comprehension, for the essence of happiness (ǧawharu alsaʿādati) is nothing more than this very thing”.38
We can see here that the irst issue is metaphysically problematic. But Averroes handles it in a
way similar to what he does in the Short Commentary on the De Anima and similar to what can be
found in Ibn Baǧǧa.39 Since intelligibles from the agent intellect cannot be received as such in the
particular human imagination belonging to the human knower, then the universals are received into
the imagination as particulars. In the Short Commentary this means that the power called material
intellect is a disposition of the forms in the particular human imagination, not new forms. Perhaps
we can describe this by saying that the particular in the imagination comes to have a qualiication
relating to universality such that the particular can be seen in the light of universality or under a mode
or consideration of universality, though Averroes does not spell all this out in the Short Commentary.
What is in the imagination then can in some way stand for the universal though the universal as
such cannot be received into a particular human imagination without being particularized and no
longer being universal. Universals then are received as particulars and are received into the particular
imagination in its unique human circumstances.40 What is received is received in the mode of the
recipient, not in the mode of a separate immaterial intellect. Hence, what the individual receives is an
individual spiritual (ruḥānī) form that is similar to the intelligible41 and that, it seems, must function
as a representation of the intelligible while also bearing some content similarity to what is in the
intelligible.42 The epistemological account by Averroes in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia
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deserves a full comparative study of its precise relation to the epistemology of the Short Commentary,
something beyond the limits of the present article. Yet it is clear that this explanation provides a
not unfeasible account of how particular human minds can hold representations of universals, an
account Averroes never develops further elsewhere. Still, the problem remains on the side of the
immaterial intellectual agent in relation to a particular recipient.
The second issue is religiously problematic in the extreme if, as people of religion commonly
believe, prophecy is from God and directed to determinate particular individuals as prophets. The
implied common religious assumption here is the view that in the case of prophetic dreams God is
providing particular intentional willed providential assistance or revelation to a particular individual.
This would mean, for example, that God chose some particular human to be his prophet through
whom God revealed the particular words of the Qurʾān by the command to recite made to this
particular human by the angel Gabriel, an intellect separate from matter. Yet as pure intellect, how
could a particular recipient of prophecy and revelation be chosen by a separate intellect? However,
even after explicitly insisting on its importance in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, Averroes
simply does not say a word on this issue and does not deal directly with it at all in this work; clearly it
must remain as remarkable and challenging as his exclamation indicated. Why does he not make his
views explicit?
It seems that Averroes found himself on the horns of a dilemma. To assert such a philosophical
teaching that immaterial entities know only universals and not particulars would involve
contradicting common religious teachings about particular willed divine action in revelation to a
particular prophet; and to assert the alternative would be to contradict the philosophical principle
that knowledge on the part of separate entities consists of immaterial universals and to hold that
those entities somehow possess knowledge of determinate particular entities.
Averroes does, however, address the issue indirectly in the inal pages of his treatment of dreams
by considering the nature of the knowledge purportedly gained in dreams. Earlier in the Commentary
on the Parva Naturalia while addressing the issue of prerequisites for the attainment of knowledge
by a particular individual Averroes explains that knowledge of concepts is culturally, temporally,
geographically and even corporeally speciic and must also be based on a prior natural experience
through the senses of what will be known.43 This consideration arises again a few pages later as to
whether what is gained in dreams is of theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge or a particular
cogitative power (quwwa ikriyya ǧuzʾiyya). As indicative of future particulars, dreaming is of the last
kind. It may be believed (qad yuẓannu) some parts of practical knowledge as found in medicine may be
grasped in sleep. However, the notion that dreams would reveal knowledge in the theoretical sciences
is completely antithetical to the very nature of such knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is garnered
through experience, as noted earlier, and the primary propositions provided to human beings by
the intellect (scil., the agent intellect).44 Were it to be provided immediately through dreams, those
primary propositions given for the sake of knowledge formation would be teleologically valueless (as
also would sensation). Here this would not be attained through an apprehension of causes but rather
without human efort and directly in dreams. Entities capable of this would be of a nature altogether
diferent from that of human beings. For Averroes such a thing is an impossibility, a method of
knowledge completely alien to the nature of human beings. Hence, the implication is that the very
notion of a separate intellect which could provide a knowledge of theoretical matters such as the
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nature of human beings or the relationship of body and soul and how they should act in accord with
their natural good is impossible. In this early work no direct solution on the second issue of how
a separate immaterial intellect could pick out a particular recipient is provided; instead, Averroes
explains how the communication of knowledge to a human being by such an intellect is itself an
impossible notion. No further implication is explicitly provided even though understanding these
matters properly should “be undertaken to the limit of one’s natural capacity for comprehension, for
the essence of happiness is nothing more than this very thing”.
Philosophical Commentaries on the De Anima
Averroes wrote three commentaries on the De Anima of Aristotle and in none of them is there an account
of prophecy found accompanying his difering considerations of human knowing. Rather, in each of them
we ind wholly naturalistic accounts with the separate agent intellect acting as a formal actuating principle
that makes intellectual abstraction possible. In each work sensory experience, primary principles from the
agent intellect for the formation of intelligibles, and a receptive subject for the apprehension of abstracted
intelligibles all play similar roles. The diferences between these works stem from diverse conceptions of
the nature of intelligibles in act and the required character of their subject, as I have explained elsewhere.45
For reference in further discussion below, it is also worth noting here that none of these commentaries has
provision for the continued existence of the human soul after death.
In his Short Commentary or Mukhtaṣar the human power of imagination in relation to
impressions received by the external senses and afecting the common sense plays a distinctive
and higher role than it does in lower animals insofar as the still particular forms or intentions that
come to be in the individual human being’s imagination become the subjects for intelligibles in act
and so for the predication of universals. It “is distinguished by the fact that it does not need an
organic instrument for its activity”.46 This is because in this work Averroes conceives the material
intellect, that is, the power receptive of the intelligibles in act in the soul that make possible human
intellectual understanding, to exist in the individual human being as a disposition belonging to the
forms in the human imagination. In his own version of an account inspired in part by Ibn Bāǧǧa
and in part by Alexander of Aphrodisias,47 Averroes understood the term “material intellect” not to
denote properly an intellect – since intellect as intellect is necessarily something in act and separate
– but rather to denote a receptive disposition (istiʿdād) having as its subject the forms existing in
the human imagination.48 In this way the imagination – which Averroes thought not to be a wholly
bodily power, at least in the case of human beings – is able to serve as substrate or foundation for a
disposition which makes possible the understanding of intelligibles in act.49 That is, the intellectual
power existing in each understanding human being called “the material intellect” cannot literally
be an intellect since an intellect as such is not a potency nor can it literally be material since matter
receives an actuality only as a particular; hence, since it is a disposition actualized in human knowing,
it remains for it to be attached to the forms of the imagination as a disposition by which human
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understanding takes place.50 In this analysis Averroes does not provide all the details and perhaps is
not fully coherent, but he does point clearly to the consequence that the individual human soul is
itself perishable on this account. For, while imagination is common to animals (and he says of human
imagination that it “is distinguished by the fact that it does not need an organic instrument for its
activity”, as noted earlier), it is nevertheless the case that the human imagination is a particular power
belonging to the individual human being and is not separate immaterial intellect. To that extent, the
power of imagination is as perishable as is the body of the human being to whom it belongs. And no
argument for the immortality of the soul can be made through appeal to the immaterial reception
of intelligibles in act into an essential power of the soul, since Averroes has said the material intellect
is not literally intellect but is rather a disposition of the forms in the imagination. Precisely how this
account allows for human intellectual understanding Averroes does not fully explain in this work,
something not surprising since he rejects this account in his later De Anima commentaries. There
is no hint or implication whatsoever for another way for the human attainment of theoretical or
practical knowledge through any power of the soul that relates to prophecy.
His Middle Commentary or Talḫīṣ, completed and in circulation by 1186, contains many texts
identical to the Long Commentary or Šarḥ based on an earlier incomplete version of the Long
Commentary.51 Although generally a paraphrasing account of Aristotle’s De Anima in three parts
in accord with the traditional division of the Greek, this work includes discussion which does not
precisely correspond to the text of Aristotle, including a paragraph52 just before his paraphrase of
De Anima 3.4 and 3.5 and a lengthy excursus53 following De Anima 3.5. It is in these additional
materials that Averroes rejects his account in the Short Commentary and sketches a new understanding
of the power of reason and the human soul. The most important development is a new analysis of the
nature of the material intellect as a subject for intelligibles in act and of its relationship to the human
soul. Disregarding the Short Commentary’s understanding of the material intellect as identiied with
a disposition of the forms in the imagination, Averroes insists that as intellect the material intellect
“cannot be mixed with the subject in which it is found” since if that were so
the forms of things would not exist in the intellect as they really are – that is, the forms existing in the
intellect would be changed into forms diferent from the actual forms. If, therefore, the nature of the
intellect is to receive the forms of things which have retained their natures, it is necessary that it be a
faculty unmixed with any form whatsoever.54

That is, the nature of intellectually understood intelligibles in act dictates that they be received
into a subject that is unmixed with the body or powers of a body or any other form. Consequently,
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the material intellect cannot be a disposition of the forms of the imagination but must rather be
immaterial intellect and yet also receptive.55 Here Averroes draws on his understanding of celestial
entities, namely, the celestial bodies which the celestial souls are ‘in’ and the intellects which are
the causes of the movement of the celestial bodies by their souls, as Marc Geofroy has rightly
pointed out.56 In the case of the eternal heavens the moving body and its soul are not composed
hylomorphically as are transitory sublunar beings. Rather, the soul is ‘in’ the celestial body without
forming a single hylomorphic composite from the two, each of which is an eternal being. In the case
of humans, the material intellect is not literally ‘in’ the body, the soul or the human composed of
the two, since the material intellect must remain unmixed to be receptive of intelligibles without
distortion by pre-existing formalities. Hence, an individual material intellect belongs to and exists
‘in’ the human soul. To this extent, the power of soul called material intellect has its existence and
individuation through its relation to and association with the individual soul existing in the body.
Although Averroes chooses not to draw the conclusion explicitly, it is clear the perishing of the
composite of soul and body also entails the loss of individualization and existence for the associated
human material intellect, that is, the human being as knower. Though he again has an important
role for the agent intellect in the abstraction and realization of forms in the human material intellect,
unlike al-Farabi and Avicenna, there is no discussion of prophecy as something received from the
agent intellect.
The Long Commentary on the De Anima is extant as a whole in Latin but in Arabic only in
fragments. It is the sole commentary on the De Anima by Averroes translated into medieval Latin.
This is a lengthy work containing the complete De Anima of Aristotle with detailed commentary
passage by passage. While Averroes himself says that this was the irst of his long commentaries,57 it
is unknown when he commenced work on the Long Commentary on the De Anima. Still, it has been
established that an early version was the likely source for some identical texts found in the Middle
Commentary and also found in an important Arabic manuscript written in Hebrew characters.58 The
version of the text represented by the Latin translation is generally taken to be Averroes’s mature and
inal understanding of the soul and intellect since its new doctrine of soul and intellect is referred to
in his late Long Commentary on the Metaphysics59 and for other reasons.60
Drawing on a new reading of his own of the teachings of Themistius,61 Averroes reconceives the
receptive material intellect as a unique and separately existing substantial principle shared by human
beings. In this work Averroes reasons that abstraction and human intellectual understanding come
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about when the two separate substances, the agent intellect and the material intellect, are intrinsically
present in the human soul by a form of sharing or participation, albeit not substantially. As I have
argued elsewhere, the separate material intellect in this work is a common locus for the unique set of
intelligibles in act abstracted on the basis of sensory apprehension and shared by all human scientiic
knowers.62 But the human soul is the irst actuality of a natural body having organs, while those
intellects are separate from body. In light of this, Averroes determines that the term soul is equivocal
and that intellect is not properly part of the substantial essence of the human soul. Explaining his
understanding of Aristotle, Averroes writes,
[I]t is better to say, and seems more to be true after investigation, that this is another kind of soul and,
if it is called a soul, it will be so equivocally. If the disposition of intellect is such as this, then it must be
possible for that alone of all the powers of soul to be separated from the body and not to be corrupted
by [the body’s] corruption, just as the eternal is separated. This will be the case since sometimes [the
intellect] is not united with [the body] and sometimes it is united with it.63

That is, for a human being soul is the actuality of body responsible for the formation of the
hylomorphic composite. The rational part of soul or intellect is not properly soul as form of the body;
it can be called soul but only in an equivocal sense. Intellect then does not belong properly and per
se to this hylomorphic composite in virtue of itself but rather is only shared through the presence of
the agent intellect and the material intellect during the earthly life of the human individual. Hence,
no argument for personal immortality can be based on the per se presence of an intellectual – and
thereby immaterial – power of the soul fully intrinsic to each individual human. The consequence is
that, while the agent intellect, the material intellect, and also the human species can be reasoned to
be eternally in existence,64 there is no basis in argument for a continued existence of the individual
human soul after the death of the body.
These philosophical works of Averroes present a considerable challenge regarding the issue
of prophecy. In each of the De Anima commentaries considered briely here he provides detailed
accounts of the complex processes of human understanding. He explains in detail the important
roles of the separate agent intellect in the Short and Middle Commentaries and of the separate agent
intellect and material intellect in the Long Commentary yet says nothing about the psychology
and metaphysics of prophecy. As indicated earlier, he was aware that the writings of al-Fārābī and
Avicenna in philosophical psychology and metaphysics contained integrated accounts of prophecy
that connected human imagination and knowing with the agent intellect. While this makes his
De Anima commentaries anomalous in relation to the work of his predecessors in the tradition, it
also makes his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia itself anomalous in relation to his De Anima
commentaries. And, while in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia he does address prophecy in
the context of a psychology and metaphysics of dreams, he clearly sets out some severe epistemological
aporiai for the account of prophecy and even chooses to say nothing in regard to what he had termed
the most important issue of all regarding “the essence of happiness”.
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Applying Averroes’s Own Method to His Works
Before attempting to provide a coherent account of the thought of Averroes it may be judicious
to consider the dating of the works discussed thus far. It is generally held that the Commentary
on the Parva Naturalia and the Short Commentary on De Anima are early works of Averroes, the
former known to be completed in January 1170 in Seville and the latter certainly earlier, perhaps
even a decade earlier. In the case of the latter, we know he returned to it much later making
corrections and revisions.65 The editor of the Middle Commentary on the De Anima, Alfred Ivry,
notes that the manuscripts give two dates for the work, 1172 and 1181.66 Because of identical
passages of in the Middle Commentary and the Long Commentary, he argues that the former is
posterior to the latter. I believe I have suiciently resolved this issue in favor of the traditional
view of the Middle Commentary having been completed irst before the Long Commentary
(completed by 1186),67 though the dating of the works of Averroes is notoriously complex. For
the argument I am building here, it is suicient to say that these two commentaries are posterior
to the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia and the Short Commentary on De Anima. In the three
commentaries on De Anima Averroes kept his primary focus on his source text and the history of
the interpretation of the nature of the soul in the philosophical tradition. It may well be that one
should not expect an account of prophecy in these, since the issue of dreams and prophecy is not
treated in the De Anima. Perhaps Averroes felt no need to raise it even though it was discussed by
al-Fārābī and Avicenna. In the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, however, the discussion of
dreams and prophecy is suitable since they are raised in his source text, the modiied version of the
Parva Naturalia. Nevertheless, the discussion of prophecy in the commentaries on De Anima is
conspicuous by its complete absence.
The three dialectical religious works discussed earlier, Faṣl al-maqāl, al-Kašf, and the
Tahāfut al-tahāfut are usually regarded as all written around 1179-1180. As explained earlier,
in these works he follows the method set out in the Faṣl al-maqāl, dividing discourse on issues
common to philosophy and religion into the evident suitable for all and the interpreted suitable
only for the philosophers. As made clear earlier, that is explicitly stated in Faṣl al-maqāl and alKašf. It is reiterated by negation in the Tahāfut al-tahāfut when he instructs his readers that the
discussions in this work should be taken as merely persuasive, scil. dialectical, and that for the
truth of the matter they should consult his demonstrative works, scil. his philosophical works.68
These works, in which a methodology for the treatment of issues common to philosophy and
religion is set out and employed, are all deinitely posterior to the Commentary on the Parva
Naturalia and to the Short Commentary on De Anima and arguably prior to the Middle
Commentary and the Long Commentary. Thus, it seems Averroes may not have yet spelled out
in suicient detail his methodology regarding works of religion and philosophy on subjects
common to both.69
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The irst step in the analysis of Averroes’s account of prophecy is to follow the very methodology
which he sets out in the Faṣl al-maqāl and references in his al-Kašf. Discourse on issues that are the
subject of both philosophy and religion, such as the afterlife, divine providence, miracles, the nature
of prophecy and the like, must be divided into two forms, one which is ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) and itting
for all human beings and another which is ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) and itting only for the learned.
The latter group does not consist in the ʿulamāʾ learned only in Islamic religious sciences but rather,
as he makes clear in the Faṣl al-maqāl, the philosophers. In that work he spelled out that, when there
is conlict in regard to truth concerning a matter of fact in both philosophy and religion, a clear
priority must be given to philosophy with its most perfect method of qiyās, philosophical burhān,
demonstration, where such is available. Where there is uncertainty or disagreement in interpretation
among those skilled in philosophy, the ‘evident’ is to be retained and promulgated for the public
and what is contentious and unresolved among the philosophically learned should not be shared
with the public. Further, should some philosophers make mistakes regarding interpretation, they
should not be held guilty of some failing since they are making their best efort over a complex and
intellectually challenging matter. However, those who share their interpretations with the public
should be condemned as themselves unbelievers since they may lead others to unbelief:
For anyone not adept in science (al-ʿilm), it is obligatory to take them [the descriptions of the next life]
in their evident sense (ʿalā l-ẓāhiri); for him, it is unbelief to interpret them because it leads to unbelief.
That is why we are of the opinion that, for anyone among the people whose duty it is to have faith in
the evident sense (ʿalā l-ẓāhiri), interpretation is unbelief (at-taʾwīl fī haqqi-hi kufrun) because it leads
to unbelief. Anyone adept in interpretation who divulges that to him calls him to unbelief; and the one
who calls to unbelief is an unbeliever.
This is why it is obligatory that interpretations be established only in books using demonstrations
(fī kutubi al-barāhīn). For if they are in books using demonstrations, no one but those adept in
demonstration will get at them. Whereas, if they are established in other than demonstrative books
with poetical and rhetorical or dialectical methods used in them, as Abū Ḥamīd al-Ġazālī does, that is
an error against the Law and against wisdom (ʿalā al-šarʿi wa ʿalā al-ḥikma).70

Eschewing the option of providing philosophical explications – an interpreted account – of the
nature of God, creation, providence, miracles, prophecy and the afterlife, Averroes explicitly states
his al-Kašf to be concerned with the ‘evident’ (al-ẓāhir) aspects of these issues and proceeds to a very
critical analysis of religious argumentation on these matters, sometimes using Aristotelian reasoning
in the course of his critique. In this work he also provides his own form of reasoned defense of
‘evident’ doctrines as an application of the methodology spelled out in the Faṣl al-maqāl. The same
is true of his writing in the Faṣl al-maqāl. In the Tahāfut al-tahāfut he also generally defends the
‘evident’ doctrines though, given the nature of the work as a philosophically reasoned response to
the critique of the philosophers by al-Ġazālī, the argument is oftentimes substantially beyond the
abilities of nearly anyone but a trained philosopher, even if he characterizes this work as dialectical
since that is its primary intention. (It is perhaps in his detailed discussions of creation that Averroes
comes closest to violating his proscription against sharing interpreted philosophical accounts with
the public, but he was required to treat this in detail despite its complexity since the issue is treated
at length with considerable depth by al-Ġazālī in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa).
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Averroes, Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 2 Butterworth. Arabic added. Tr. slightly modiied.
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In his philosophical or demonstrative commentaries on De Anima and his Long Commentary on
the Metaphysics Averroes denies the afterlife as literally understood to human beings or the human
soul. In the latter work he also argues in detail against the notion of creation ex nihilo reasoning
for a conception of creation as without beginning and also against the notion of particular divine
providence. Regarding the nature of God, he reasons in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics
that God has only knowledge of Himself, a conception of knowledge based on the Aristotelian
notion that knowledge is the understanding of causes.71 As such, knowledge of particulars qua
particulars is unavailable to God as immaterial intellectual knower of universals (quite in accord with
the reasoning of the early Commentary on the Parva Naturalia). This has important implications for
his conception of prophecy.
Now since he has made it clear in his discussion of method on issues common to religion
and philosophy that it is impossible for truth to contradict truth, that is, he denies that there
is one truth for religion and another for philosophy,72 it is then in philosophy or science that
the truth is fully found. The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia does not provide any
discussion of the distinction of discourse reasoned in detail by Averroes in the Faṣl al-maqāl.
Rather, its account of prophecy is philosophically discussed in the manner of what he later
calls an ‘interpreted’ discourse, one denoting the truth in the fullest sense, even if he does not
complete the discussion of the second issue there, namely, how an immaterial intellect can
know particulars. Hence, it is clear that nothing prevents us from asserting that the teachings
(and their implications) found in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia are in accord with his
own thought on the nature of prophecy. It may well be that the cautious distinction of ‘evident’
discourse from ‘interpreted’ discourse spelled out in detail in the Faṣl al-maqāl and exercised in
al-Kašf and Tahāfut al-tahāfut determined for Averroes a methodology he would make efort to
employ from the time of the writing of the Faṣl al-maqāl. Regardless of that, Averroes’s world
view is non-traditional and, as Davidson puts it, involves “an extremely radical statement for
a medieval philosopher”.
The deep concerns indicated by Davidson with respect to the Commentary on the Parva
Naturalia remain and can be raised even more broadly. For Averroes there is no cogent
philosophical account of prophecy that is congruous with the traditional religious conception of
prophecy as literally a conveyance and instruction provided to human beings on the nature of God,
on the things of world, or on the proper nature of human conduct and fulillment. Davidson’s
remarks that “The discrepancy is harsh” between the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia and
what we ind in “Averroes’ Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and semipopular works” can be considered as a
consequential symptom of the doctrine of the two sorts discourse, one in the non-philosophical
works as predominantly ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) containing a teaching meant to be taken literally, the
other philosophical in aiming at the truth in the fullest sense and labeled ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal).
Davidson’s further assertion follows if we ourselves play the role of philosopher and apply
Averroes’s own method to his works: “The term prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing
more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of
philosophical knowledge”.73
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See Averroes, Tafsir ma baʿd at-tabiʿat, pp. 1708-9 Bouyges.
See R.C. Taylor, “ ‘Truth does not contradict truth’: Averroes and the Unity of Truth”, Topoi 19 (2000), pp. 3-16.
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes (above, n. 9), pp. 351-2.
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Some concluding remarks
Averroes’s teachings on prophecy as well as those on the afterlife, creation, God’s nature and
action, miracles and other related issues follow from his eforts to craft his own Neo-Aristotelian
rationalist Weltanschauung or worldview while living in a cultural context of Abrahamic traditions
which set out a conception of God distinctively diferent from that of the pagan Greek Aristotelian
philosophical tradition. While the deity of this religious tradition is conceived as generous and
benevolent, intimately present to the world, and acting freely in every way, the Neo-Aristotelian
approach philosophically conceived and followed by Averroes entailed principles antithetical to
that religious tradition. These are hardly diicult to see regarding his conception of the divinity.
God is thought thinking thought intending only Himself, not something lower. Further, since
there are only four causes for his philosophical master Aristotle, inal, formal, moving and material,
God is not a ifth kind of eiciently creating cause nor is God intimately and immediately acting
in the lives of things below by his own eicient causality. Averroes does not provide us with any
other explanation of the conciliation of the religious and the philosophical or scientiic except
what we ind in the Faṣl al-maqāl’s reasoning and entailments. He provides no discussion of any
approach similar to that of Kantian antinomies or a method to transcend the philosophically ‘harsh’
consequences which follow on his methodology. Nevertheless, he was man of Islamic religious
practice and a deeply intelligent and committed jurist who played key roles in the application of
religious rules of human practice in the courts of Cordoba and Seville.
One might be inclined to conclude that Averroes remains an enigmatic igure with an
idiosyncratic conception of his professed Abrahamic religion. Yet he clearly enough explains
his philosophical worldview methodically and generally follows that method in his writings,
setting out teachings that accord with the principles of religion in his ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) works
while reserving explanations that clash with religion for investigation by philosophers suited for
‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) writings. In this he develops perhaps more explicitly and more radically
the worldview found in the writings of al-Fārābī who airmed an afterlife but also in his Book of
Religion (Kitāb al-milla) explained that virtuous religion has a practical part that sets out universals
and rules for right human action though these are properly speaking “subordinate to the universals
of practical philosophy” and a theoretical part that consists of religious opinions which “have their
demonstrative proofs in theoretical philosophy and are taken in religion without demonstrative
proofs”.74 Averroes’s al-Kašf represents his attempt to craft a form of ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) religious
kalām largely on the basis of a Neo-Aristotelian based critique of reasoning by predecessors on
religious opinions or beliefs. Yet in his ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) works of philosophy, he sets out
teachings that are directly – or by clear argumentative implication – quite contrary to those of
the religion in which he was raised, as mentioned just above in the previous paragraph. What is
more, as I have shown elsewhere,75 in his theoretical Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle
he states explicitly that the most perfect form of worship of the Divinity is to be found in knowing
God and creatures in the science of metaphysics as a religious obligation speciic to philosophers
(al-šarīʿa al-ḫāṣṣa bi-l-ḥukamāʾ).76 Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that Averroes found

Alfarabi. The Political Writings. Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts, tr. Ch.E. Butterworth, Cornell U.P., Ithaca London 2001, p. 97.
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Taylor, “Averroes on the Sharīʿah of the Philosophers” (above, n. 6).
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Cf. S. Harvey, “Avicenna and Maimonides on Prayer and Intellectual Worship,” in H. Ben-Shammai (ed.),
Exchange and Transmission across Cultural Boundaries: Philosophy, Mysticism and Science in the Mediterranean World,
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in philosophy and its sciences the most complete and precise truth content and highest levels of
knowledge and understanding and from them constructed his worldview. Given that perspective,
religion — which is indispensable for proper human ethical and political development77 – is like
an Aristotelian practical science in that it concerns good and right conduct in the achievement of
an end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own sake.78

Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem 2013, pp. 82-105,
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See Averroes, Tahāfut at-tahāfut, pp. 582-3 Bouyges; tr. pp. 359-61.
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